The New Monetary Economics (NME) predicts that a low-transaction-cost world will be characterised by monetary separation. Different assets will compete as stores of value and medium of exchange. Current innovations in the payment system are often interpreted as bringing us closer to such a moneyless world.
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Towards a Moneyless World?
A central bank basically has two products: bank notes and deposits. Financial innovation seems to have the potential to decrease the demand for both products dramatically. Therefore, increasingly the question is asked, how long there will be a demand for bank notes and central bank deposits. In most countries, deposits with the central bank have already declined dramatically. At the same time, financial innovation threatens to eliminate the demand for bank notes as a medium of exchange and a store of value. According to some economists this will not simply lead to a replacement of one type of money (say banknotes and deposits) by another. They argue that "money" as it is known today will disappear. Instead, people will hold mutual fund shares and similar instruments that will also be used in order to make payments ('mutual fund banking').
1 If financial innovation can, indeed, be expected to reduce the demand for bank notes and central bank deposits to zero, central banks would loose control over the short-term interest rate. They would no longer be able to conduct a monetary policy.
The New Monetary Economics
Is money as we know it today a model that will soon be part of history? The New Monetary Economics seems to deliver the theoretical underpinnings for an affirmative answer. Current innovations in the payment system are often interpreted as bringing us closer to the moneyless world described in the New Monetary Economics. In a first step, the main arguments and predictions of the New Monetary Economics will be simply described. After that it will be shown how the New Monetary Economics has been used to predict the consequences of current financial innovations.
Finally, a critical assessment will be given. In particular, it will be discussed whether recent financial innovations will, indeed, bring us closer to the world envisioned in the New Monetary Economics.
A. The Main Elements of the New Monetary Economics
The subject of the New Monetary Economics is the financial system in a world of falling transaction costs and decreasing public regulation. It is not a homogenous body of theories and it overlaps with other theories such as the 'legal restrictions theory' of money. But the main thesis can be summarised as follows. In the Brave New World of low transactions costs and little (if any) public regulation "money", as we know it today, will cease to exist. The term "New Monetary Economics" was coined
by Robert Hall (1982b) . 2 Hall criticises traditional theories, such as Keynesian and monetarist approaches, and favours a new view. Acknowledging Hall's as well as Fischer Black's and Eugene
Fama's contributions Robert Greenfield and Leland B. Yeager have introduced the term 'BFH system' for the system that is envisioned by exponents of the New Monetary Economics. What are the main features of the BFH system? In spite of differences in opinion all authors agree that an unregulated monetary system would be characterised by monetary separation. In the current system money (cash and deposits) is used as medium of exchange and unit of account. In the BFH system there would be no common medium of exchange with a fixed nominal value in terms of the unit of account. Instead, assets with variable prices are used. This implies that, in principle, any asset could serve as a medium of exchange. An example that is often used to illustrate 'moneyless' payments are mutual funds shares. The value of mutual funds' shares varies with the value of the funds' assets and within certain limits they can be used for making payments. So, the medium of payment 'mutual fund share' has a value that is not fixed in terms of the commonly used unit of account. Eugene Fama (1980) argues that monetary separation is efficient because the financial system (Fama uses the term 'banks') serves two functions that are independent of each other: the accounting function and the portfolio management function. Banks could fulfil the accounting function without holding assets or using any medium of payment. 3 It would be sufficient to have a unit of account. As an uninvolved third party, banks could just keep records of transactions. The issue of liabilities and the purchase of assets is derived from the second function, the portfolio management function. In this function banks help individuals to hold their wealth in a form they desire.
2 Important contributions are Black (1970) , Kroszner (1987, 1994) , Fama (1980 Fama ( , 1983 , Yeager (1983, 1986) , Hall (1982a Hall ( /b, 1983 . Related ideas can be found in Niehans (1982 Niehans ( , 1983 , Sargent and Wallace (1982) , Tobin (1963) and Wallace (1983 Wallace ( , 1988 . The idea is reviewed in Hoover (1988) , Krueger (forthcoming), McCallum (1985) , Neldner (1997) and White (1984) . 3 Therefore, Hoover (1988, 153) although in the payment systems he describes, there are no 'dollars' circulating as a medium of exchange. Thus, the dollar turns out to be a purely abstract unit of account. Cowen and Kroszner (1994) even think that it is likely that numerous units of account will be used simultaneously. As they point out, this would allow to take heterogeneous preferences into account. The increased transaction costs of multiple units of account are deemed to be negligible. However, most of the other authors maintain that a single unit of account is more efficient.
How are payments made in the BFH system? Fama (1980 Fama ( , 1983 describes a moneyless payment system as a pure accounting system in which banks record transactions. This is, by itself, not much different from the current system with traditional cashless payments methods. Just like today, payments can be made using checks or debits. But in contrast to today's payment system, the payment system is run by financial intermediaries whose liabilities are not nominally fixed. If somebody wants to make a payment he transfers the corresponding value in the form of shares to the account of the payee. The value of assets and liabilities is always expressed in terms of the unit of account and constantly marked to market. Such a transfer can be brought about with all kinds of assets. Therefore, according to exponents of the New Monetary Economics it does not make sense to single out certain assets as 'money'. In principle, any agent can use his entire wealth for payments.
Additionally, he may draw on open credit lines. Thus, there is no fixed amount of media of payments, but still there is a stream of payments. 4 As Black (1970, 9) puts it:
'In such a world, it would not be possible to give any reasonable definition of the quantity of money.
The payments mechanism in such a world would be very efficient, but money in the usual sense 4 According to Niehans (1982, 23) this is the case already in euromarkets.
would not exist. Thus neither the quantity theory nor the liquidity preference theory would be applicable.'
Sometimes it is acknowledged that cash may be required for small payments. However, the potential survival of cash is judged in different ways. Fama (1983) argues that the use of cash for payments makes it possible for the central bank to conduct an orthodox policy of base control in order to determine the price level. Black (1970) , however, regards the stock of currency as purely passive variable that is determined by the demand for currency and has no significance for price level determination.
The transition into a moneyless world is also seen differently by various authors. Cowen and Kroszner (1994) interpret the transition as a more or less inevitable process. Fama (1980) seems to regard a wide-ranging deregulation as a precondition. Greenfield and Yeager (1983, 305 ) even deem it necessary to explicitly rule out the issue of small denomination, fixed value government debt in order to safeguard a moneyless payment system against a return to monetary payments.
Abstracting from transaction costs, the exponents of the New Monetary Economics claim that deregulated system with monetary separation offers a number of advantages.
a. The BFH system is assumed to be more efficient than the current system. In an unregulated, competitive environment there will no longer be a penalty on liquidity (in the form of interest foregone). Agents can use interest earnings assets in order to make payments. Household and firms no longer need to engage in liquidity management. Thus real resources are saved. In other words, the much cited 'shoe leather costs' can be avoided. 5 However, if it is more efficient to pay interest on money, the question naturally arises why this does not occur today. sheets is determined by their customers. Thus there is no influence from the financial sector on the real sectors of the economy. This result has been derived in a similar fashion by James Tobin (1963) already, who claimed that the credit creation abilities of banks are a 'myth'. As Fama (1980, 45) points out, this result implies that the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem applies to the financial sector -even when considering that financial intermediaries take over information and control functions and allow diversification at lower costs. As long as the market is competitive, according to Fama, it must be neutral with respect to the real economy. Black (1970) and Greenfield and Yeager (1983) derive a similar conclusion.
d. Greenfield and Yeager (1983) , in particular, have stressed that monetary separation would help to avoid the painful consequences of inflation and deflation. While today changes in the supply of or the demand for money necessitate changes of millions of prices, a prolonged and painful process, in the BFH system disequilibria can be removed instantaneously by changes of financial market prices. Since medium of exchange and unit of account are separated, the value of the unit of account (in terms of goods) is not affected. For instance, an increase in the demand for money (which is not fully accommodated by monetary policy) would lead to a fall in aggregate demand in the current system. In such a case, a new equilibrium can only be reached by an adjustment of the price level. If many goods' and factor prices are sticky, unemployment will be the result. In the BFH system an increase in demand for certain assets would only have the effect that the prices of these assets are rising and that prices of other assets are falling. There would be no need for a change in goods' prices. Thus, the painful side effects of sticky prices could be avoided.
Points c. and d. imply that, in the BFH system, Say's Law is never violated. Every supply of goods implies that agents wish to demand current or future goods. Any demand is based on a supply of goods and services. Macroeconomic disequilibria, i.e. excess demand or excess supply, is impossible (Neldner 1997, 17) . In contrast to a monetary world, in which hoarding is possible, the equality of saving and investment is always fulfilled. This view has been expressed in a pointed manner by Black (1970, 18-9) :
'When an individual decides to spend more, some other individual must decide to spend less.
Borrowing must equal lending; an increase in one must be balanced by an increase in the other.
Thus an added demand for consumption goods by one individual must be balanced by a reduced demand for consumption goods by another individual. So, aggregate demand is not affected.'
The New Monetary Economics is not a homogenous theoretical system. The authors make use of diverging approaches and focus on different aspects. For instance, Cowen and Kroszner (1994) use an evolutionary approach. They point out that money has allowed for a deeper division of labour and the formation of a large number of new markets (incl. financial markets). However, financial markets would finally reach a state of efficiency that would allow agents to dispense with money.
Thus the development leads to a barter system of higher order. Black (1970) and Fama (1980 Fama ( , 1983 are using the theory of finance. Similar to Modigliani and Miller (1958) , they develop their argument within a general equilibrium framework without transaction costs. This framework allows them to derive the neutrality of the financial sector. Furthermore, it leads to the conclusion that an unregulated system would be more efficient. In contrast to Fama and Black who are mainly concerned with efficiency, Greenfield and Yeager (1983) focus on question of aggregate stability (long term stability and medium term, cyclical stability). They are concerned about the potential of the monetary sector to destabilize the economy.
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While the theoretical ideas of the New Monetary Economics seems to point into the direction of a radically different financial system, the exponents of this approach follow a more gradualist approach when it comes to making economic policy prescriptions. Relatively close to the theoretical approach is the idea that there can be a purely abstract unit of account that is not tied by convertibility to any goods or financial assets. This idea can be found in Black (1970) , Cowen and Kroszner (1994) , Yeager (1983) 9 and Hall (1982a) . While some of the authors (e.g.
Cowen and Kroszner) want to leave it to the market to determine the right unit of account, others (e.g. Greenfield and Yeager) think that this remains a task of the state.
Other ideas are more conventional, basically representing modifications of the present system. Black (1987) proposes a kind of adjustable gold standard that has much in common with Irving Fisher's (1920) 'compensated dollar'. Fama (1983) proposes a monetary base targeting. Hall (1983) develops the idea of an interest bearing reserve certificate that pays a relative interest rate (relative to other save assets) which is tied to the inflation rate. Greenfield and Yeager (1986) propose a system of indirect convertibility.
B. Financial Innovation and the New Monetary Economics
Some authors have used the New Monetary Economics in order to analyse the consequences of the financial innovations in the payment system. Thus, Cronin (1995, 1997) (Browne and Cronin 1995, 102-3) What Browne and Cronin predict is the substitution of emoney for currency and finally the substitution of direct asset transfers for monetary exchange. The key in this future development is the capacity of financial innovation to reduce transaction costs. Browne and Cronin (1995, 104) predict that falling communication costs will make the use of emoney cheaper. Falling prices and greater convenience of emoney (including interest paid) will reduce the demand for banknotes towards zero. However, the development will not stop at this point. Falling transactions costs will also reduce the demand for emoney because the brokerage fee falls to negligible levels, so that agents can almost instantaneously switch into and out of other assets at hardly any cost (Browne and Cronin 1995, 109) . 11 At the same time, according to these authors, reserves of banks are likely to decline. The main reason for this is, that falling transactions costs will make it possible to settle debts -both in wholesale and in retail transactions -increasingly by real time asset transfers (Browne and Cronin 1995, 108, 111) . So, the endpoint of the development is a moneyless world where either the old monetary unit 12 or a commodity-based unit such as Robert Halls (1982a) ANCAP is used as a unit of account. According to Browne and Cronin (1995, 108, 114) , practical problems of running a payment system based on claims with variable value will become insignificant as financial innovation proceeds because the transfer of marked-to-market shares is supposed to be a cost-competitive alternative to deposit transfers (Browne and Cronn 1997, 162) .
The authors see only very limited possibilities for central banks to stop or retard this process towards a moneyless world. They argue (Browne and Cronin 1997, 157 ) that regulation would only drive customers to less regulated institutions, possibly incorporated off-shore. Furthermore, they point out (Browne and Cronin 1997, 156) (Browne and Cronin 1995, 112) .
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Even before the state of a pure accounting system is reached, there would be more stability, because in a system in which emoney is used, any bank that overissues would be affected much faster by adverse clearing than in a paper-based system. Therefore, there would be a strong market discipline on emoney issuers (Browne and Cronin 1995, 105-6) .
2. Critical Assessment: The Moneyless World Ante Portas?
Will falling transaction costs make it unnecessary to use a common medium of exchange? Will monetary separation become the rule rather then an odd case reserved for hyper-inflations? The answer to these question is, of course, speculative in character. Still, empirical and theoretical 12 Banknotes may still have value as a collectors' item, so that there would be a market demand for banknotes. Therefore, according to the authors, the price level would still be determined. See Browne and Cronin (1995, 110) . A similar argument can be found in Fama (1980, 55-56) . 13 See also Browne and Cronin (1997, 163) where they flatly state that 'changes in the aggregate price level do not arise in an ASE' ['accounting system of exchange', M.K.].
reasons can be found that strongly suggest that a common medium of exchange will also be used in a low transaction cost environment.
A. The Role of Network Effects
In a classical article, Eugen von Böhm Bawerk (1962 Bawerk ( /1914 posed the question whether 'control' or 'economic law' determines prices. 14 His answer was that control has only a temporary influence on prices. In the long run, economic laws are bound to prevail. However, there may be cases in which economic laws work in a way that enhances the power of a single market participant, providing him with discretionary power over prices. One case is a technology that exhibits network externalities.
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In such a situation the utility a consumer derives from using a particular network is a positive function of the size of network. In many cases, the 'size of the network' can be approximated by the number of users. Telecommunications is a good example to illustrate this point. The usefulness of a phone rises with the number of users. In such a situation "economic laws" will favour a situation with just one network.
Focussing on the unit of account or medium of exchange function money can also be interpreted as a network -a payment network. This idea is also captured in the notion that the use of a particular asset ('money') for payments can be interpreted as a convention (Dowd and Greenaway 1993; Menger 1892; Sugden 1986, 52-3; Wärneryd 1989 ) like a language or the habit to drive on the right hand side. In all these cases, the utility for a single user depends positively on the number of all users. Dowd and Greenaway (1993) have proposed to formalise this idea by using an utility function such as (1): 14 In the original version of the article Böhm-Bawerk uses the German term 'Macht' which could also be translated as 'power'. 15 Vaubel (1984, 33-41) discusses network effects under the heading 'transaction cost externalities'. The relevance of network externalities theory for emoney is discussed by Van Hove (1998) . 16 They are drawing on work of Farrell and Saloner (1986) . u(T) is the utility that is derived from adhering to a convention or using a network from time T onwards, r is a discount factor, a captures the network-independent benefits and blnN captures network-related benefits, N is the number of users. As can be easily seen, utility is rising with the number of people who adhere to the standard. However, the fact that lnN is used implies declining marginal utility of a rising number of users.
This view stresses the significance of the general acceptability that becomes a value of its own. As long as most agents are prepared to accept money in exchange with goods, money will be accepted instead of goods because it lowers transaction costs. This holds independently of whether the issuer is prepared to guarantee convertibility or not. As long as the value of the money is not systematically and strongly reduced, it will be accepted.
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What makes money acceptable to an individual is the belief or the experience that it is also accepted by others. This belief is self-enforcing and imposes strong limitations on individual choices. As long as others can be expected to accept money there is no incentive for an individual to substitute the money good for something else because such a decision would imply that the individual ceases to participate in the division of labour. Just like in the case of other kinds of conventions, the convention to use a certain good as common medium of exchange has a strong tendency to persist. Dowd and Greenaway have used their model to show that there can be "excess inertia" when network externalities exist. Suppose, that at time T* a new monetary standard is offered that provides the following benefits if universally adopted (Dowd and Greenaway 1993, 1182) :
Even if this new standard promises higher benefits than the old, it is not certain that it will be adopted. First, there may be switching costs s that have to be incurred when switching from u to v. 
. If v(T) v -s < u(T) u it will not be adopted even if v(T) v > u(T) u . Second,
even if the potential advantages of v are much larger than the switching costs s, this does not necessarily mean that v will be adopted. The reason is that the benefits for a single user depend on the number of users. For a single user, the benefit of using v when everybody else is using u is 
(T) u -s < u(T) u < v(T) v -s c/r -s < (a+blnN)/r <(c+dlnN)/r
the outcome depends on the expectation about the behaviour of the other market participants. In this case the superior standard v will only be adopted when potential users expect others to adopt it as well. 18 Thus, money not only solves a co-ordination problem it also creates one when money-users would like to switch to a different kind of money. A change could only be brought about by a coordinated effort of all money-users. In the case of fiat money this co-ordination problem is particularly severe. First, the number of money users is very large. Second, the network-independent 18 The number of users (or expected users) must pass a critical mass. This can be seen in chart 1. The critical mass in the case without switching costs is N 2 *. In the case with switching costs it is N 1 *.
benefit (a or c) is likely to be close to zero. Therefore, the difference between v(T) u and u(T) u is likely to be very large, providing little incentives for a single user to switch. The fact, that switching out of a particular currency involves high costs is supported by the "well-established 'stylised fact'" (Dowd and Greenaway 1993, 1184 ) that it takes extremely high inflation rates in order to induce people to substitute the commonly used currency. This persistence in turn strengthens the expectations that money will also be used in the future.
As Dowd and Greenaway (1993, 1184-5) point out, excess inertia may imply that competition between currencies will usually not be very intensive. So, monetary authorities have a lot of latitude in monetary policy even when there are no legal restrictions. Higher inflation does not necessarily mean that money users will substitute into other monies because this would only be beneficial for the individual money user if it occurred simultaneously in one co-ordinated move. Due to high coordination costs such a move is almost impossible. According to White (1997, 19 ) the switch of a standard of value requires "public debate and deliberate public decision". Therefore, persistence of a given medium of exchange also has the consequence that the state can change the character of money -at least to a certain degree. The state can enhance the quality, for instance, by standardising and certifying a certain quality and weight (Menger 1892 , Gravelle 1988 . But the state can also decrease the quality -for example by monopolising money and abolishing convertibility -without triggering the flight into other monies. In this sense, the monies currently circulating can be interpreted as the result of both, evolutionary forces and state interventions. This does not, however, make money a creature of state action as proposed, for instance, by Wallace (1988).
In the framework outlined by Dowd and Greenaway it remains somewhat abstract what exactly is meant by the term 'payment network'. After all, even within a currency area there is competition between different types of money, for instance cash and deposits. Clearly, one does not drive out the other. However, both these types of money are linked by a fixed exchange rate of 1:1 and perfect convertibility. Therefore, both media of payment are readily accepted and can co-exist. This suggests that the issuer of a new type of money can connect to the existing payment system by using a 1:1 exchange rate and pledging full convertibility. Thus there can be different media of exchange if they are all expressed in the same unit of account.
The existence of network effects casts doubt on the prediction of the New Monetary Economics that there will be monetary separation, many media of exchange with fluctuating market prices and, according to some authors, even many units of account in the future. However, it may be argued that falling transaction costs undermine the validity of this argument. As will be shown in the next paragraphs, this is not the case. While technical innovations reduce some transaction costs, others remain.
B. Benefits of a Common Medium of Exchange in a Low Transaction Costs World
Admittedly, in a general equilibrium framework without transaction costs an agent would be indifferent as to which asset he receives in payment (Fama 1983, 9) . At the current market price, any amount of a particular asset could be exchanged against another asset. However, many economists doubt that the Walrasian framework is suitable for the analysis of monetary phenomena (Goodhart 1989 , Hellwig 1993 , Laidler 1984 , 1990 . The idea of a centralised auction, as useful as it often may be, seems to be too remote from the world as it is to explain real world institutions such as money.
'If a monetary economy solves the same problems as would a competitive market, it might often be save to assume that it acts 'as if' it were in fact a market economy, and that is why conventional microeconomic analysis is a useful tool for analysing the real world. However, when it comes to analysing the processes of disseminating and processing information themselves, and those of coordinating activity, it is important to choose between assuming a monetary economy and a
Walrasian market economy. It is a fundamental error to assume the existence of a clearing
Walrasian market as the first step of an attempt to understand money.' (Laidler 1989 , 106) Goodhart (1989 proposes to use the market maker model instead of the Arrow-Debreu Walrasian auctioneer to analyse monetary phenomena. It provides a more realistic view of the organisation of a wide variety of markets -in particular financial markets. Once the Walrasian framework is abandoned, the assumption that agents are indifferent with respect to the type of asset they receive as payment is no longer tenable (Hoover 1988 , 152-3, White 1984a . Sales or purchases of assets involve costs, there is a spread between buying and selling prices (bid-ask spread) and when larger quantities are involved, market participants have to take into account that the market price may move against them. Technical progress can reduce some of the transaction costs but it cannot totally eliminate them.
Transactions costs in financial markets do not just consist of hardware and software costs. An important cost component consists of the costs of market making. Without such market makers it could be difficult and time consuming to find a trading partner who is willing to trade at an acceptable price. The price for the services of market makers usually consists of the difference between the bid and the ask price (the 'spread'). The spread is not just technically determined but also by considerations of risk. Stoll (1985, 82) Of these four categories, the first is the one that is most directly affected by technical progress. But that still leaves the other three. Leaving monopoly power aside, the market maker has to be rewarded for the price risk he is taking while holding a position and he has to be compensated for losses incurred in trading with better informed traders (Bagehot 1971 , Stoll 1985 . These costs can be Consequently, price fluctuations would be larger and the risk for market makers would be higher. If a common medium of exchange would be used, there would be only (n-1) markets. Thus, the number of markets would be smaller by a factor of 2/n. Turnover in each market would be, on average, n/2 times higher. This would mean that demand and supply in each market were more elastic. Prices would fluctuate less and the risk for market makers would be smaller. Similarly, as Alchian (1977) has pointed out, when there is no common medium of exchange, it is hardly possible for a trader to specialise, because he has to be informed about any good that may be offered as payment. 20 If there is one low information cost medium of payment, a trader can specialise in gathering information about a particular good (or a group of goods) that he exchanges against money. This, in turn reduces his risk when trading with informed traders. Thus, even if, initially, there is no common medium of exchange, there are strong incentives to use one because it expands market volume and reduces transaction costs.
If there were more than one medium of exchange, there would also be higher negotiation costs because trading partners do not just have to negotiate the price, the quantity, time and place of delivery etc, but also the means of payment. This will make negotiations more costly. Thus, in a world with transaction costs a common medium of exchange is also a tool to reduce negotiation costs.
The fact that transaction costs may make some assets more suitable for the settlement of transactions than others is also acknowledged by Fama (1983, 10) : However, he does not explain why cost minimisation would allow for more than one medium of exchange. After all, negotiation costs and the number of markets could further be reduced if just one medium of exchange were used.
Already today, many of the existing wholesale markets operate with highly sophisticated technical equipment that makes it possible to communicate and deal at extremely low costs. However, the significance of these technical factors should not be overrated. As the example of the foreign exchange market shows, the use of a common medium of exchange has advantages even in a low cost environment. Much of the costs of banks and brokers have fixed cost character, so that marginal communication costs are close to zero. Still, what can be observed in this market is, that one currency, the US$, takes over the role of a common medium of exchange (a 'vehicle currency'). In 8 out of 10 transactions the US$ can be found on one side. 21, 22 The explanation is simple. It is usually cheaper to exchange, for instance, Japanese Yen into US$ and then US$ into Pound Sterling instead of exchanging Yen and Pound directly. Since the volume of trade is higher in the US$-Yen and the US$-Pound market, the spreads are lower. So, although transaction costs are low in foreign exchange markets, they can be lowered even further when a common medium of exchange is used.
Thus there is no 'foreign exchange barter' in the foreign exchange market. As the example of the foreign exchange market shows, even if the current technical innovations are carried further, making retail payments as efficient as current wholesale transactions, it can be doubted that this would lead to the demise of the use of a common medium of exchange. Niehans (1978, 120-122) has pointed out that, the use of a common medium of account reduces 'accounting costs' in a complex price system. Accounting costs are defined as costs of search and information (Niehans 1978, 119) . Assuming that accounting costs are a positive function of the number of prices, Niehans shows that the use of a common unit of account may lead to considerable cost savings. In his example there are 1,000 commodities and accounting costs of 1 cent per price. If there is no common unity of account agents will have to cope with 499,500 relative prices. Thus there will be accounting costs of almost 5,000$ per agent. However, if a common medium of account would be used, there would be only 999 money prices and accounting costs would be roughly10$. To illustrate the argument, suppose an agent wants to know the price of a bar of chocolate and is told that it costs '5 cigarettes'. Being a non-smoker, '5 cigarettes' does not mean very much to this agent. So, he asks how much this is in terms of coffee. The seller, not being a coffee drinker does not know. This could go on for a while until they are able to express the price in terms of a unit that is meaningful for both of them. As can easily be seen, transaction costs would be lower if the same unit of account would be used in all price quotations. Even if it is taken into account, that people may soon carry little computers with them that would allow them to calculate prices in terms 21 See BIS (1996, (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) . In the other 20 percent the DM figures prominently. This can be explained by the fact, that the DM is the anchor currency in the EMS. DM and US$ together can be found in far more than 90 percent of all foreign exchange transactions. 22 The US$ is also used as invoicing currency in a large fraction of international trade and prices of many internationally traded commodities (such as oil) are quoted in US$.
C. Benefits of a Common Unit of Account in a Low Transaction Costs World
of the preferred unit of account. Walking through the supermarket, constantly typing prices into a little computer would be highly inconvenient.
A multitude of units of account involves additional problems. For instance, firms will find it more difficult to calculate profits, because it may be possible that transactions carried out over a certain period will lead to a profit when calculated in one unit of account and a loss when calculated in another unit of account.
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D. Monetary Separation
Monetary separation makes additional calculations necessary because each agent has to convert prices that are expressed in terms of the unit of account into units of the medium of exchange.
Basically, each agent has to calculate in two value systems: a unit of account system and a medium of exchange system. As the vast literature on correct accounting in times of inflation shows, this is no easy task and it involves considerable resources (Niehans 1978, 127) . In fact, historically it could be observed, that even in times of fairly high inflation people still thought and calculated in terms of Dollars, Marks or Francs.
A somewhat similar problem arises currently, if an agents travels to a foreign country. In this country, his is forced to use the local currency as a medium of exchange. However, as a rule, the traveller will convert prices into units of his home country currency, before he makes a buying or selling decision. As any traveller knows, these conversions are cumbersome and time consuming.
E. Conclusions
While the current pace of financial innovation is clearly remarkable, it should not be overlooked that this innovation has mainly to do with the reduction of communication costs. Of course, this also reduces transactions costs. However, it is erroneous to assume that a reduction of communication costs towards zero reduces overall transaction costs to zero. Transaction costs depend also on many market characteristics such as the size of the market and the volatility of supply and demand. The use of a common medium of exchange that also functions as unit of account is a way to increase the size of the market and make it more liquid. This reduces transaction costs -when communication costs are high and when they are low.
Proponents of the New Monetary Economics basically claim that barter can be more efficient in a low transaction cost environment than monetary exchange. In the BFH world, goods and assets are exchanged without using a common means of payment and the 'payment system' is reduced to a mere accounting system that keeps track of the values exchanged. However, the mere fact that transaction costs are falling does not imply that the advantages of monetary exchange are going to vanish (Garcia 1998, 6; Grünärml 1989, 200) . A reduction of transaction costs per transaction is likely to increase the number of transactions. Therefore, it is possible that the quantitative significance of transaction costs rises even when costs per transaction are falling. Empirical studies such as North and Wallis (1986) show that the transaction cost sector of the economy has, indeed, been increasing over time.
To sum up: Even if communication costs drop to zero transaction costs will be positive. Even when transaction costs per transaction are falling, transaction costs in per cent of GDP may be rising.
Therefore, 'money', defined as a common medium of exchange that serves as unit of account, will not go out of business in the foreseeable future.
Internet Money: International Competition via Borderless Payments?
Even if it seems unlikely that the BFH world will become reality soon. Current innovations may radically alter the shape of the payment system Thus emoney may replace cash and erode the ability of central banks to control the monetary system. In particular, the possibility to make payments via the 'borderless' and hardly controllable internet seems to jeopardise central bank control of the monetary sector (Tanaka 1996, Herreiner 1998, 11, 14 and 24) . It is argued that monetary control may become impossible if the issuer of electronic money can be based anywhere in the world.
However, this view does not take the fact into account that internet money does not really circulate and that it has to be constantly exchanged for deposits. Even if a new kind of electronic money could be re-spend without using the service of a bank (like Mondex), it can be expected that a large portion of electronic money receipts will be converted into deposits because a large portion of payments agents are able to switch between these different monies at low cost. 25 A common means to lower transaction costs is standardisation. As has been pointed out above, the use of a common unit of account and the denomination of media of exchange in terms of this unit can reduce transaction costs. Furthermore, once a unit of account has been established, it will be replaced only under extreme circumstances. Therefore, it can be assumed that different moneys within on country will also be denominated in one unit of account, most likely the one that is currently used.
26
Thus, the best way to market new emonies is to denominate them in the established unit of account and to make them fully convertible into other forms of money (cash and deposits). So, there must be an intersection between the 'old', established payment system and the new, spontaneously evolving one (electronic money). As long as locals have an account with local banks and might wish to convert emoney into local deposits this intersection can only be in their home country and is consequently under the control of the local authorities. However, White (1997, 19-20) and England (1997, 144) assume that even in retail banking there may be a shift towards off-shore banks. As
White points out, this presupposes that foreign-based banks can participate in the local clearing process. As long as central banks are heavily involved in interbank clearing they can control access to this system. Thus, it is under their discretion to allow direct involvement of offshore banks in interbank clearing. Currently, most countries seem to rule out the participation of foreign banks in national clearing systems. 27 This puts offshore banks at a disadvantage compared to onshore banks.
24 Source: Sachverständigenrat (1997) and own calculations. 25 For instance, in futures markets there are not hundreds of different contracts for wheat, one for each brand, but only one or two (see Black 1986) . In fx markets the dollar is used as a vehicle currency. Contrary to Angel's (1997) assertion in these markets it matters whether there is trade in one or 1000 items. The possibility to store 1000 currencies cheaply on a chip does not mean that it would be cheap to use them. In particular, it would not mean that they could be exchanged at low cost. Rather it can be expected that for such a large number of currencies bid-ask spreads would be huge (see above). 26 This is also what currently happens. Emoney issuers issue money that is denominated in national currencies. The only exceptions are 'Cyber bucks' which have been issued in limited amounts by DigiCash. (Plus, maybe, some barter firms.) 27 One reason for this is that participation in interbank clearing usually involves access to central bank credit. See the discussion about the access of UK banks to ECB overnight credit, for instance Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), 37 and Davis (1997) .
Therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that unregulated offshore banks will compete retail business away from onshore banks.
Chart 2 Given the payment systems as they are today, it is conceivable that somewhere in the world (in country 3) a firm issues money that is used in other countries for payments (see chart 2). However, in this case, a customer from another country (country 2) who wants to use this emoney has to pay for it. Supposedly, this will be in "normal" money. So, either the issuer has an account in country 2 or the customer has to make an international transfer from country 2 to country 3. Furthermore, if the payment receiver (say an internet store in country 1) wants to convert the emoney balances he receives into national currency, the issuer has to transfer country 1 money to his account. Again, this presupposes an international transfer or an account with a local bank. So, either the issuer is actually present in the other countries or he has to rely on the inefficient and expensive international retail payment system (involving foreign checks or money orders). This is true, even if supplier can accept credit cards payments. In this case, the issuer of internet money could also use a credit card organisation to transfer the money. Again, this would involve a payment to one of the traditional providers of payment services as an extra cost. Thus the efficiency of the whole scheme partly depends on the efficiency of the traditional payment system 28 . The traditional system, however, is regulated and monitored by government authorities. Even if electronic money can move unhampered past borders the counter-rotating flow of goods and deposits can do this only to a certain degree. As Anderson (1997, 4) has pointed out: 'Geography has wormed its way back into cyberspace, using tools such as sales tax, credit-card restrictions and shipping.' Therefore, the hypothesis of Tanaka (1996) that international internet payments will be as cheap as national internet payments has to be doubted. Similarly, it is not realistic to assume that agents will hold a wide array of electronic currencies on their hard drives in the future. Rather it can be expected that one currency will become the 'world internet currency' for cross border payments. In all likelihood, this will be the US$ -just like in foreign exchange markets (see above).
Conclusions
Market transactions involve transaction costs. One way to reduce these costs is the use of a common medium of exchange and unit of account -'money'. Since the main benefit of using money stems from the fact that others are accepting it, the use of money entails network effects. Thus there are strong economic forces at work preserving the competitiveness of the established monetary unit.
While falling transaction costs may reduce the advantages of monetary exchange they will hardly eliminate them. The costs of transacting in markets have many sources. Communication and information processing costs are only one source. Therefore, it is not likely that the 'communication revolution' will eliminate the need for a common medium of exchange and unit of account.
Network effects are also important when new types of money, such as emoney, compete with established forms of money such as cash and deposits. Emoney issuers can greatly enhance the acceptance of their products if they denominate them in terms of the existing account and if they guarantee 1:1 convertibility with established forms of money. Such a measure, however, subjects them to central bank influence, no matter whether they are banks or non-banks and no matter whether they operate on-shore or off-shore. Thus central banks will be able to conduct monetary policy even if their products lose market share.
